

## Message Text

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ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /031 W  
----- 094142

O P 291005Z AUG 74

FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 5203

INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY NICOSIA PRIORITY

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY

USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 ATHENS 6212

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR CY GR TU UN NATO

SUBJ: AMBASSADOR'S DISCUSSION WITH MAVROS

1. SUMMARY. I TOOK ADVANTAGE OF OCCASION PROVIDED BY DEPUTY PM AND FOREIGN MINISTER MAVROS' REQUEST FOR ME TO CALL TO RECEIVE PM CARAMANLIS' ANSWER TO SECRETARY'S LETTER (SEPTEL) TO REVIEW VARIETY OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS RELATING TO CYPRUS PROBLEM. POLITICAL COUNSELOR ACCOMPANIED ME. SUBJECTS INCLUDED PRESENT STATUS OF SITUATION ON ISLAND, POSSIBLE NEXT STEPS, VISIT OF UNSYG WALDHEIM, SOVIET UN PROPOSAL, POSSIBILITY OF ENLISTING SUPPORT OF WESTERN EUROPEAN STATES FOR GREEK POSITION, CLERIDES-DENKTASH TALKS, VISIT OF PAKISTAN DEPUTY FONMIN AGA SHAHI AND STATUS OF MAKARIOS. END SUMMARY.

2. MAVROS SAID DE FACTO SITUATION ON ISLAND WAS THAT OVER ONE-THIRD OF TERRITORY WAS CONTROLLED BY 18 PERCENT TURKISH POPULATION BUT INVOLVED APPROXIMATELY 70 PERCENT OF CYPRIOT ECONOMY. THERE WERE APPROXIMATELY 200,000 GREEK CYPRIOT REFUGEES. IT WAS COSTING GOG \$10 MILLION PER MONTH TO COVER BUDGET. GOG DESIRED TO SEE CYPRUS TERRITORY APPORTIONED IN RELATION TO POPULATION, AND IT OPPOSED ANY

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EXCHANGE OF POPULATION, BELIEVING THAT REFUGEES SHOULD

RETURN TO THEIR HOMES. TURKS, HOWEVER, WANTED GREEKS TO SIGN AGREEMENT RECOGNIZING STATUS QUO.

3. I ASKED MAVROS WHAT STEPS TURKISH FORCES MUST TAKE FROM GREEK POINT OF VIEW. FOR EXAMPLE, WOULD EVACUATION OF FAMAGUSTA BE ENOUGH? MAVROS REPEATED THAT REFUGEES MUST BE PERMITTED TO RETURN AS WELL BUT DID NOT ELABORATE FURTHER. HE REFERRED SADLY TO FUTURE PROSPECT OF WIDESPREAD TERRORISM, PARTICULARLY IF SPARKED BY EXTENSIVE LOOTING IN WHICH TURKISH FORCES HAD BEEN ENGAGED.

4. WHEN I RAISED QUESTION WHETHER UNSYG WALDHEIM HAD BROUGHT ANY NEW IDEAS TO ATHENS, MAVROS SAID HIS BIG CONCERNS WERE REFUGEE PROBLEM AND UNFICYP OPERATIONS. HE OBSERVED THAT NEITHER UNFICYP NOR RED CROSS WERE NOW PERMITTED TO OPERATE IN TURKISH HELD AREAS. UNFICYP WAS PRACTICALLY CONFINED TO ITS BARRACKS. SINCE UN TROOPS COULD NOT USE FORCE AGAINST TURKS, THEY WERE UNABLE TO CIRCULATE TO VERIFY WHAT WAS GOING ON. MAVROS REMARKED THAT TURKS WERE BEHAVING ON ISLAND AS IF THEY HAD FURTHER EXPANSIONIST INTENTIONS, AND AS HE HAS TOLD ME PREVIOUSLY, GOG CONTINUES TO BELIEVE THAT IN FACT TURKS HAD DESIGNS ON SOME GREEK ISLANDS AS WELL.

5. REGARDING FOSIET UN PROPOSAL, MAVROS EXPLAINED THAT GOG RECOGNIZED PROPAGANDISTIC CHARACTER AND EMPHASIZED SO-CALLED GREEK ACCEPTANCE WAS "IN PRINCIPLE" BECAUSE GOG COULD NOT AFFORD TO TURN IT DOWN. AT SAME TIME HE HAD PERSONALLY WARNED SOVIET AMBASSADOR THAT GOG WAS NOT INTERESTED IN PARTICIPATING IN ANY PROPAGANDA FORUM AND THAT ITS SOLE CONCERN WAS TO BRING ABOUT IMPLEMENTATION OF UNSC RESOLUTION 353. IF GOG DID NOT RESPOND POSITIVELY ON IMPLEMENTATION ISSUE GOG WOULD LEAVE ANY DISCUSSIONS THAT CAME ABOUT AS RESULT OF SOVIET PROPOSAL. I ASKED HIM IF PROXIMITY OF UNGA DID NOT MAKE WHOLE IDEA OF DISCUSSION IN EXPANDED SC-SPONSORED FORUM UNDER SOVIET INITIATIVE POINTLESS. HIS RESPONSE WAS GOG CONSIDERED ITS POSITION WAS USEFUL FOR BOTH WORLD AND GREEK PUBLIC OPINION.

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6. I ASKED MAVROS WHETHER GOG SEEKING ANY SUPPORT FROM OTHER NATO MEMBERS, MENTIONING AS EXAMPLES FRG AND FRANCE. I NOTED THAT FRG PERHAPS HAD SPECIAL INFLUENCE IN TURKEY GIVEN EXTENT TO WHICH IT WAS ARMS SUPPLIER AND ALSO BECAUSE OF LARGE NUMBER OF TURKISH WORKERS IN FRG. MAVROS REPLIED THAT GOG HAD THIS POSSIBILITY IN MIND AND INDICATED THERE HAD BEEN SOME PRELIMINARY

DISCUSSIONS WITH GERMAN AMBASSADOR HERE. HE AGREED  
INJECTION OF EUROPEAN NATO MEMBERS COULD BE HELPFUL.

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EXDIS

7. CONVERSATION TURNED TO RECENT VISIT PAKISTANI  
DEPUTY FM AGA SHAHI. MAVROS SAID THAT BHUTTO WAS CLOSE  
FRIEND OF CARAMANLIS AND HAD GOTTEN IN TOUCH WITH HIM  
DIRECTLY. HE ADDED THAT IN INITIAL STAGE OF CYPRUS  
CRISIS PAKISTAN HAD BEEN "VERY HOSTILE" TO GREEK  
INTERESTS AND HAD OFFERED MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO  
GOT. HOWEVER, AFTER CARAMALIS GOVERNMENT WAS FORMED  
BHUTTO HAD INQUIRED WHETHER GOG WOULD INVITE PAKISTANI  
REPRESENTATIVE TO COME TO ATHENS TO DISCUSS SITUATION.  
GOVERNMENT HAD AGREED THAT ANY INVITATION WAS OUT OF  
QUESTION SINCE IT WOULD BE INTERPRETED AS GREEK REQUEST  
FOR PAKISTAN MEDIATION, BUT THAT GOG WOULD RECEIVE PAKISTANI  
IF HE WISHED TO COME. THIS WAS BACKGROUND OF VISIT, AND  
MAVROS GAVE ME DISTINCT IMPRESSION THAT IT HAD SERVED NO  
PURPOSE OTHER THAN TO DESCRIBE GREEK POSITION TO AGA SHAHI.

8. I ASKED MAVROS HOW GOG VIEWED FUTURE OF MAKARIOS.  
MAVROS EXPLAINED THAT MAKARIOS CURRENTLY WAS SEEKING  
TO ARRANGE MEETINGS WITH HEADS OF STATE, PARTICULARLY IN  
FRANCE AND USSR. GOG DEFINITELY DID NOT WANT HIM TO COME  
TO ATHENS. HE WAS "PASSIVE FACTOR" IN SITUATION AND HIS

ATTITUDE WOULD BE IMPORTANT ONLY IN CASE PARTIES ARRIVED  
AT SOLUTION. ACCORDING TO MAVROS, MAKARIOS HAD PROMISED  
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GOG TO DO NOTHING WITHOUT INFORMING GOG. HE ADDED THAT  
HE HAD ADVISED UNSYG TO SEE MAKARIOS IN LONDON.

9. MAVROS EXPRESSED LIMITED OPTIMISM ABOUT USEFULNESS  
CLERIDES-DENKTASH DISCUSSIONS. ALTHOUGH GREECE AFTER ITS  
HUMILIATION IN GENEVA COULD NOT AFFORD TO TALK DIRECTLY  
WITH TURKS IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES THESE TWO COULD JUST  
CONCEIVABLY MAKE SOME PROGRESS, PARTICULARLY SINCE  
CLERIDES WAS IN A POSITION TO MAKE CERTAIN CONCESSIONS.  
TOP PRIORITY WAS FOR THESE TWO TO DEAL EFFECTIVELY WITH  
REFUGEE PROBLEM. I ASKED WHETHER GOG THOUGHT DENKTASH  
WOULD ALSO HAVE SOME LATITUDE. MAVROS RESPONDED  
AFFIRMATIVELY. HE COMMENTED, HOWEVER, THAT HE HAD JUST  
HEARD THAT DENKTASH HAD REMARKED THAT SEPTEMBER 15 MIGHT  
BE DATE TO DECLARE INDEPENDENT TURKISH STATE OF CYPRUS  
BECAUSE TURKISH COMMUNITY DID NOT WANT CLERIDES TO  
REPRESENT CYPRUS AT UNGA. SO FAR AS GOG WAS CONCERNED  
BOTH COMMUNITIES COULD HAVE REPRESENTATIVES IN NEW YORK  
SO LONG AS UN CONTINUED TO TREAT CYPRUS AS SINGLE ENTITY.  
OF COURSE IF ANY OTHER STATES RECOGNIZED PUTATIVE TURKISH  
REPUBLIC, THIS WOULD CREATE PROBLEMS.

10. AS CONVERSATION CONCLUDED, MAVROS COMMENTED SADLY  
THAT IT WAS "A TRAGEDY THAT A COUNTRY LIKE TURKEY  
COULD COLLAPSE SECURITY SYSTEM OF ENTIRE WESTERN WORLD."  
HE REMAINED OPTIMISTIC THAT SOLUTION WOULD EVENTUALLY BE  
FOUND AND ACQUIESCED IN MY COMMENT THAT IT WAS UNFORTUNATE  
THAT ANDROUTSOPOULOS REGIME HAD RENEGED ON IDEA OF PACKAGE  
PROPOSAL ENCOMPASSING ALL ISSUES PENDING BETWEEN GREECE  
AND TURKEY. MAVROS CONCLUDED IN LONG RUN SOME SUCH  
NEGOTIATING PACKAGE WAS ONLY EFFECTIVE WAY TO RECONSTRUCT  
SATISFACTORY GREEK-TURKISH RELATIONS. TASCA

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